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Abstract
Probability forecasts are intended to account for the uncertainties in-
herent in forecasting. It is suggested that from an end-user’s point of
view probability is not necessarily sufficient to reflect uncertainties that
are not simply the result of complexity or randomness, for example, proba-
bility forecasts may not adequately account for uncertainties due to model
error. It is suggested that an alternative forecast product is to issue non-
probabilistic odds forecasts, which may be as useful to end-users, and give
a less distorted account of the uncertainties of a forecast. Our analysis of
odds forecasts derives from game theory using the principle that if fore-
casters truly believe their forecasts, then they should take bets at the odds
they offer and not expect to be bankrupted. Despite this game theoretic
approach, it is not a market or economic evaluation; it is intended to be
a scientific evaluation. Illustrative examples are given of the calculation
of odds forecasts and their application to investment, loss mitigation and
ensemble weather forecasting.
1 Introduction
Our concern here is the quantification of uncertainty in forecasting. Suppose
our task is to forecast the possibility of overnight temperatures at a particular
location falling below freezing. This is a task of significant economic impor-
tance, for example, for the salting and gritting of roads, and for preparations to
mitigate of frost damage in horticulture. Forecasts of this type use atmospheric
observations and computer models of the physical processes of the atmosphere.
Uncertainty arises in these forecasts from the complexity of the weather, from
the sparsity of observations, from the simplifications and inadequacies of the
computer models, and so on. The suggestion we make here is that in some
situations, such as using forecasts to mitigate losses, probability may not be
the best means to quantify the uncertainty of the forecast. We suggest that
non-probabilistic odds may provide a useful alternative to some forecast users.
A probability forecast quantifies uncertainty by assigning a probability to
the occurrence of an event. If the process that determines the outcome of the
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event is intrinsically random, then there can be a correct or optimal assignment
to the probability. The forecaster, however, may be uncertain about the cor-
rect probability value to assign, and this leads to consideration of the influence
of other uncertainties, which we discuss shortly. A well established means for
quantifying the uncertainty of probability forecasting systems are reliability or
skill scores. Brier [1950], Murphy, Winkler [Murphy and Winkler, 1977, 1987,
Murphy, 1993, Winkler, 1994], and many others since, have considered using
scores to assess the skill of a probability forecast. Skill scores are closely related
to issues of calibration of probability forecasts [Foster and Vohra, 1998, Palmer,
2000, Roulston and Smith, 2002, Smith, 1995]. An alternative assessment of
skill is the economic value of the forecast [Granger and Pesaran, 2000]. Eco-
nomic value is closely related to the idea of wagers. One can imagine a market
of forecasters who take bets on the outcomes of events they forecast; the fore-
casters that profit the most, or at least avoid bankruptcy, are considered the
better forecasters. In a competitive market only those forecasters who know
the true probabilities of events will survive in the long term [Shafer and Vovk,
2001]. In the short term, however, merely lucky forecasters can survive, and even
excel [Johnstone, 2007]. Consequently, for a forecaster to be a top performer
they are forced to act like a bookmaker or marketeer rather than a scientist.
Scientists aim to learn the true probabilities of events, whereas bookmakers and
marketeers respond to the opportunities of a market [Levitt, 2004].
A probability forecast and a skill score together give a more complete picture
of the uncertainty of a forecasted event. We will argue here, however, that
probability forecasts can give end-users a misleading picture of uncertainty. We
suggest a method of avoiding this problem is to issue odds forecasts, which arise
naturally as wagers. In the next subsections we state our distinction between
odds and probability, and describe briefly how odds can quantify multiple aspects
of uncertainty. Section 2 introduces a mathematical formalism for the process
of issuing odds forecasts, including a brief review of the necessary concepts and
techniques of game theory. Most importantly we show how the computation of
odds can be framed as a simple optimisation problem. In section 3 we compute
odds in four basic forecasting situations and compare these computed odds
with the corresponding probabilities. In section 4 we describe how odds can
be employed in investment and loss mitigation. Finally, in section 5 we use
operational ensemble weather forecasts and station data to present a concrete
example of issuing odds forecasts.
1.1 Odds and probability
Given a complete set of m mutually exclusive events, that is, one and only one
of the events will occur, we define odds to mean an assignment of real numbers
qi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, to the events. If
∑m
i=1 qi = 1, then the odds are probabilistic
odds, and the qi are probabilities. Casinos and bookmakers assign odds so that∑m
i=1 qi > 1, which has the consequence that, on average, they should profit
from the bettors. The excess over one of the sum is sometimes termed “juice”,
“take”, vigour”.
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We argue that if a forecaster truly believes their forecasts, then they should
take bets at the odds they offer and not expect to be bankrupted. This can
always be achieved by a sufficiently large excess, however, the scientist’s goal
ought to be to avoid bankruptcy with the smallest excess.
Taking wagers while avoiding bankruptcy is a powerful principle. Extending
early work of Ville it has been used by Foster and Vovk [1999], Skouras and Dawid
[1999], Shafer and Vovk [2001], Dawid [2004] and others. Shafer and Vovk [2001]
provides a beautiful development that derives probability theory itself from
betting principles. The ideas developed in this paper share a conceptual and
structural formulation with Shafer and Vovk [2001], but there are significant dif-
ferences. Briefly, the differences arise because in our opinion non-probabilistic
odds are relevant to the immediate and short-term consequences of uncertainty,
whereas probabilities are generally more relevant to long-term and asymptotic
uncertainty.
Bid-ask spreads in financial markets can be interpreted as non-probabilistic
odds [Levitt, 2004, Johnstone, 2007], but our development of odds differs be-
cause we want our forecaster to behave as a scientist and avoid market pressures
influencing the odds.
1.2 Levels of uncertainty
Uncertainty arises from many sources, not just randomness. To appreciate this
consider Jacob Bernoulli’s foundational example of drawing balls, with replace-
ment, from a urn containing a number of red and black balls. Suppose the
fraction θ of red balls in the urn is known, and the process of extracting a ball is
sufficiently complex to appear uniformly random, that is, on any selection each
ball in the urn is equally likely to be drawn. In this situation the uncertainty
is entirely due to the “random” process of selection, and the uncertainty is ad-
equately described by the probability of drawing a red ball, which is θ. We will
refer to this situation as having first order uncertainty.
Knowing θ allows one to make a probability forecast, that is, the probability
of the event “drawing a red ball” is θ. This is a simple forecast model. Indeed,
under our assumptions, this is a perfect model, because the model exactly rep-
resents the process, and there is no better model. In a perfect model there is
only first order uncertainty.
If the number of red and black balls in the urn is unknown, then a value ψ
for the fraction of red balls could be inferred from the observed fraction of red
balls seen in a number of draws. Using ψ to forecast the probability of a red ball
is an imperfect model, there is both first order uncertainty from the randomness
of the process being forecast, and second order uncertainty due to the value of
ψ used.
It is possible to make a further distinction between a perfect model class
and an imperfect model class. For the urn a value of 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 defines a
class of forecast models. If the assumption of uniform random selection of balls
is valid, then this is a perfect model class, because the value ψ = θ provides
a perfect model. If the random selection assumption does not hold, because
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perhaps the balls are not thoroughly stirred before each selection, then no value
of ψ provides a perfect model; a perfect model would have to take into account
the conditional randomness, or even non-random effects, of mixing the urn after
each replacement. Uncertainty about the correct model class is at least third
order.
1.3 At odds with probability
One goal of forecasters is to issue accountable, or reliable, or well calibrated,
probability forecasts [Foster and Vohra, 1998, Smith, 1995, Palmer, 2000], that
is, if it is forecast that an event E will occur with probability p, then the ob-
served fraction of events E out of all events asymptotically approaches p. It is
vital to recognise that an imperfect model will almost certainly not provide an
accountable probability forecast. At best forecasts are only accountable asymp-
totically in a perfect model class, but even this is a delicate problem [Oakes,
1985, Foster and Vohra, 1998].
Suppose that for an urn game a forecaster a provides odds for outcomes of
draws, and takes bets at these odds. If the forecaster knew θ, and the uniform
random selection assumption held, then probabilistic odds could be issued where
a one unit bet on a red ball pays 1 − θ and betting a black ball pays θ. With
these probabilistic odds the forecaster does not expect their wealth to increase
or decrease on average, no matter how skillful the bettors. If the forecaster had
only an estimate ψ, then providing probabilistic odds, where a bet on a red ball
pays 1 − ψ and a bet on a black ball pays ψ, would be unwise. Any bettor
who knew θ would almost surely bankrupt the forecaster by always betting a
fraction θ of their current wealth on the red ball, and betting the fraction 1− θ
of their current wealth on the black ball [Kelly, 1956]. A similar result is true
when the bettor just has a better estimate of θ. The fact that ψ = θ is the only
value of ψ that does not lead asymptotically to certain bankruptcy can be used
to define the concept of probability [Shafer and Vovk, 2001].
The essential problem with using imperfect models to provide probability
forecasts is the higher order uncertainties, like model error, distort the odds.
In particular, we will show that model error often results in under estimating
the chance of events that have low probability, a so-called base-rate effect. We
argue that by using non-probabilistic odds forecasts, rather than probability
forecasts, a forecaster can provide a less distorted forecast that takes into ac-
count model error. (Here we only show how to do this for particular second
order uncertainties.)
We argue that if a forecaster aims to provide odds that are as close to
probabilistic as possible, subject to known information and the model class
used, then the amount by which the odds exceed one is a measure of how
certain the forecaster is of their model. The excess is a measure of second order
uncertainty. (Here we only demonstrate how to do this for a perfect model class
with particular utility functions.)
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2 Computation of odds forecasts
The theoretical framework in which we analyse odds forecasting is game the-
ory [von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, Shafer and Vovk, 2001]. There are
three “players” in our game: the Forecaster, the Client, and Nature. The Client
determines the structure of the game. Imagine that the Client approaches the
Forecaster and requests odds for a complete set of m mutually exclusive events
Ei, i = 1, . . . ,m. Which event actually occurs is determined by Nature, who is
ignorant and indifferent to the Client-Forecaster negotiations. For our purposes
we may assume that Nature’s selection of an event is random, or of such com-
plexity that the selection is assumed random by the Client and Forecaster. (By
making this assumption about Nature we avoid issues of third order uncertain-
ties.)
When the Client approaches the Forecaster, the Client does not specify in-
terest in any particular event within the set of mutually exclusive events. The
Forecaster is required to supply odds for all events, based on past observations
of Nature and the Forecaster’s model. The Forecaster is not a bookmaker, they
are a scientist. The objective of the scientist Forecaster is to provide odds as
close to probabilistic as possible given the available information and their model
class, because by doing so they are aiming to obtain the best forecast model.
It may be tempting to imagine many clients and forecasters competing in
a market to determine the best forecast model, but this has the propensity for
forecasters to adopt the strategies of marketeers and bookmakers. To avoid
forecasters acting this way we will isolate the Forecaster from market informa-
tion: there will be one Client and the Forecaster is not allowed to know how the
Client bets, only the choices of Nature. If the Forecaster knew the pattern of
the Client’s bets, then this constitutes an additional information stream [Kelly,
1956], and consequently can be used to improve the Forecaster’s performance
against the Client, or against Nature if the Client is a more skillful forecaster
than the Forecaster. Using this additional information stream allows marketeer-
ing and bookmaking, rather than scientific forecasting. Denying the Forecaster
knowledge of the Client’s bets forces the Forecaster to rely on available observa-
tions and modelling skill alone. Shortly we will see, however, that the Forecaster
will need to know a little about the Client’s betting.
2.1 The Game
We have a three person game. Nature plays indifferently with no aim. The
Client aims to accumulate winnings. The Forecaster aims to set as close to
probabilistic odds as possible, without the Client bankrupting the Forecaster.
If there were just two events, E and its complement E′, then the game can be
represented by a game matrix G.
G:
client
nature
E E′
E P −1
E′ −1 P ′
(1)
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The game matrix represents the pay-out to the Client for a one unit bet on an
event given Nature’s outcome. The odds set by the Forecaster in this case are
P to 1 for event E, and P ′ to 1 for event E′.
There are several variants of this game according to the rules that govern
the Client’s bets; the variants can influence how the Forecaster sets the odds.
One rule that can be introduced is the Client’s bets are a fixed size and a
negligible fraction of the Client’s (and Forecaster’s) total wealth, effectively,
infinitesimal bets. Alternatively, the Client can bet a substantial fraction of
their wealth. Other rules that might be introduced govern whether the Client is
forced to make a bet, regardless of the odds, or whether the Client can split bets
over several events, or whether there is a minimum size of a bet on any event.
Rules governing the sizes of bets can influence the Client’s utility function of
wealth, and consequently influence the pattern of bets. With variable sized
bets the Client can choose to maximise the growth of wealth, a logarithmic
utility function, which requires distributing bets over several events. Forced
bets of a fixed (infinitesimal) size essentially implies a linear utility function of
wealth, and results in betting only on the event that the Client believes gives
the maximum pay-out.
Since the Forecaster does not know the Client’s individual bets, the Fore-
caster must at least know the Client’s utility function of wealth, or the rules
governing how the Client can bet, which effectively force a utility function onto
the Client.
The ultimate challenge for the scientist Forecaster is to compete against a
Client who knows the true probabilities of Nature, and yet do so without being
bankrupted.
2.2 Forced bets of fixed (infinitesimal) size; linear utility
Much of the analysis in this section is text book game theory [von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944]. We first consider the zero-sum game between the Client and Nature and
determine the Client’s optimal strategy for fixed odds. We then derive an opti-
mal odds assignment of the Forecaster for an arbitrary probability model under
the assumptions of a perfect model class.
2.2.1 Optimal Client strategy
For a complete set of m mutually exclusive events Ei, i = 1, . . . ,m, the m×m
game matrix G of the zero-sum game between the Client and Nature (represented
in 2 × 2 case in (1)) has Gij = (δij/qi) − 1, where δij = 1 if i = j and zero
otherwise, and qi is the odds for event Ei, or equivalently, the odds on event Ei
is “Pi to 1”, where qi = 1/(Pi+1). Assume that Nature plays a strategy where
event Ei is chosen randomly with probability pii. Supposing that the Client
plays a strategy where event Ei is chosen with probability pi, then the average
pay-out to the Client is (
m∑
i=1
piipi
qi
)
− 1. (2)
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Here
∑m
i=1 pii = 1,
∑m
i=1 pi = 1, but
∑m
i=1 qi ≥ 1, with equality if and only if
the odds are probabilistic.
The minimax strategy for the Client is to select event Ei with probability
p⋆i , and has average pay-out V
⋆, where
p⋆i =
qi∑
i qi
, V ⋆ =
1∑
i qi
− 1.
By using the minimax strategy the Client is guaranteed an average pay-out of
at least V ⋆ regardless of the pii. When the odds are probabilistic, then the
minimax strategy for the Client has pi = qi and V
⋆ = 0. It follows that the
optimal Client strategy is to choose pi = 1, when i is the index such that pii/qi
is maximal, and pi = 0 otherwise. The average pay-out to the Client is then
maxi{pii/qi} − 1.
2.2.2 Optimal Forecaster strategies
The forecaster’s aim is to make the odds as probabilistic as possible without
the client’s winnings accumulating without bound. The forecaster has to allow
for the possibility that the client is a better forecaster, in the worst case, the
Client knows Nature’s probabilities pi = (pi1, . . . , pim). There is no single optimal
strategy to achieve the goals we have set for the forecaster, so some additional
guidance is necessary.
Since the game matrix G is symmetric, it can be seen from equation 2 that
the ideal strategy for the forecaster is to set the odds so that qi/
∑m
j=1 qj = pii,
in which case the closest to probabilistic odds are the probabilistic odds qi = pii.
This is, of course, a meaningless solution, because the pii are unknown. Simply
taking an estimate pˆi of Nature’s probabilities pi, and using these as odds, qi = pˆii,
is unwise, because at least one pii/pˆii > 1, which will be exploited by the more
informed Client, who can obtain a better estimate of pii.
If the forecaster accepts their forecast model is imperfect, then they will ac-
knowledge there are many likely values of pi. However, if the forecaster assumes
their model class is perfect, then given data D they can assert that under their
model Pr(pi | D) ∝ Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi), where Pr(pi) represents prior knowledge
about possible values of pi. From this the forecaster can compute the average
loss (pay-out to the client) V (pi, q) for given pi and odds q = (q1, . . . , qm),
V (pi, q) = max
i
{
pii
qi
}
− 1 (3)
The expected loss E(V | D, q), given the data D and fixed odds q, is
E(V | D, q) =
∫
S
V (pi, q) Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi∫
S Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi
, (4)
where S is the simplex
∑
i pii = 1. A possible optimal strategy for the forecaster
is
min
∑
i
qi subject to
∫
S
V (pi, q) Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi = 0. (5)
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The minimisation attempts to ensure the odds q are as probabilistic as possible.
The constraint E(V | D, q) = 0 attempts to ensure that whatever the true pi,
the odds are such that the client’s average pay-out is zero given the assumed
distribution of pi. The construction of equation (5) implies that the client’s
wealth is a martingale [Doob, 1953, Williams, 1991], that is, if Wn is the wealth
of the client after n plays of the game, then E(Wn | D, q) = Wn−1 + E(V |
D, q) =Wn−1.
Observe that the constraint E(V | D, q) = 0 is not, in principle, hard to
compute. Define
S = {pi:∑i pii = 1} , (6)
Si(q) = {pi ∈ S: i = argmax{pii/qi}} , (7)
Ai(q) =
∫
Si(q)
piPr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi, (8)
C =
∫
S
Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi. (9)
The strategy given by problem (5) in equivalent to
min
∑
i
qi subject to
∑
i
Ai(q)
qi
= C. (10)
Observe that even if Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) has a complex form, if it can be computed
by Monte Carlo methods, then all the Ai(q) and C can be computed simul-
taneously. The main difficulty is that the constraints have to recomputed for
each q.
2.3 Forced bets of entire wealth; logarithmic utility
We now consider the situation where the game rules require the client to bet their
entire wealth. This is a natural mathematical extension of infinitesimal forced
bets. With probabilistic odds this game leads to the Kelly betting strategy of
distributing the client’s entire wealth as bets proportional to the probabilities
of events. This strategy maximises the growth rate of wealth, or equivalently,
a logarithmic utility function of wealth. However, as Kelly [1956] explains,
when the odds are not probabilistic, then the client should not bet their entire
wealth, only a fraction of it. We will insist that the client is forced to bet their
entire wealth. The unfairness of this restriction is balanced by the information
advantage of the client. If the forecaster tries to make the odds as probabilistic
as possible, then the odds can still interest the client.
Once again, suppose there is a complete set of mutually exclusive events Ei,
i = 1, . . . ,m and a m ×m game matrix G with Gij = (δij/qi) − 1. The client
plays nature and is required to bet their entire wealth at each play. Suppose
that after n plays of this game, the client has total wealth Wn, and at each
play the client distributes their current wealth as bets in the proportion pi on
event Ei. Assume nature acts as though the events are chosen randomly, with
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Ei chosen with probability pii. Then the expected wealth of the client after n
plays, given an initial wealth W0, is
E(Wn) =
(
m∏
i=1
(
pi
qi
)πi)n
W0
Consequently, the average rate of growth of wealth is
lim
n→∞
1
n
log(Wn) =
m∑
i=1
pii log(pi/qi).
It is easily shown that the maximum growth rate occurs when pi = pii. This is
the optimal Kelly betting strategy for a client that knows nature’s pii. Hence,
define G(pi, q) =
∑m
i=1 pii log(pii/qi).
An appropriate forecaster strategy is to set the closest to probabilistic odds
so that expected rate of growth of wealth of the client is zero, that is,
min
m∑
i=1
qi subject to
∫
S
G(pi, q) Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi = 0. (11)
Equation (11) implies that the logarithm of the client’s wealth is a martingale,
that is, E(logWn | D, q) = logWn−1 + E(G | D, q) = logWn−1.
Remarkably the optimisation of equation (11) has an explicit form for the
solution, which means that in some instances closed form solutions are possible.
Define, using C as in equation (9),
H¯ =
1
C
∫
S
m∑
i=1
pii log(pii) Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi, (12)
p¯ii =
1
C
∫
S
pii Pr(D | pi) Pr(pi) dpi, (13)
α = H¯ −
m∑
i=1
p¯ii log(p¯ii). (14)
The constraint E(G | D, q) = 0 in (11) is equivalent to ∑mi=1 p¯ii log(qi) = H¯ .
By straight forward application of Lagrange multipliers it can be shown that
qi = p¯iie
α solves the required optimisation (11). The explicit form of the solu-
tion, in terms of constants that are obtained from integrals, means that in some
instances closed form solutions are possible. A valid interpretation of this opti-
misation result is that the inflation exponent α is the discrepancy between the
expected entropy (or information) −H¯ and the entropy implied by the expected
probabilities p¯i.
3 Examples of odds forecasting
To illustrate the computation of odds we consider two situations forecasting
binary events. The first situation uses a frequency model, which requires only
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knowledge of the frequency of past events. The aim of the forecaster is to
provide odds on a future event. (This is the urn game.) The second situation
uses a Gaussian model, where the available data is a finite collection of scalar
measurements assumed to be drawn from a Gaussian distribution. The aim of
the forecaster is to provide odds on a future measurement being below some
threshold. We will actually consider four situations because we will compute
the odds for both linear and logarithmic utility.
3.1 Frequency model with linear utility
Consider the situation where there are two events E and its complement E′,
where Nature selects E with probability pi and E′ with probability pi′ = 1− pi.
A frequency model assumes that all realizations of the events are independent,
so only the frequency of the event provides any information about pi. The
forecaster is required to assign odds q and q′ to events E and E′.
Suppose the event E has been observed to occur x times in n realizations.
Under the frequency model Pr(pi | x, n) ∝ Pr(x | pi, n) Pr(pi) = Cnxpix(1 −
pi)n−x Pr(pi). Suppose the forecaster has no prior information on pi, and so
assumes a uniform prior Pr(pi) = 1, that is, assumes all values of pi are equally
likely.
Following equation (10) the constraint on q and q′ to obtainE(V | x, n, q, q′) =
0 can be expressed in terms of beta and incomplete beta functions,
1
q′
β q
q+q′
(x+1, n−x+2)+ 1
q
β q′
q+q′
(n−x+1, x+2) = β(x+1, n−x+1), (15)
where βx(a, b) =
∫ x
0
ta−1(1− t)b−1 dt and β(a, b) = β1(a, b). Defining s = q + q′
and q = ps, so q′ = (1− p)s, then solving equation (15) for s, will conveniently
transform problem (10) into a one-dimensional problem,
min
0≤p≤1
s =
1
1−pβp(x+ 1, n− x+ 2) + 1pβ1−p(n− x+ 1, x+ 2)
β(x+ 1, n− x+ 1) . (16)
This problem is easily solved numerically using Brent’s method or similar [Press et al.,
1988].
Figure 1 shows computed odds for various observed frequencies for a small
number of observations in a table, and for progressively larger numbers of ob-
servations in the graph. Figure 2 shows the total odds s = q + q′. A number of
interesting, but not unexpected, facts can be seen. For a small number of obser-
vations the odds are far from probabilistic, but they become more probabilistic
as the number of observations increase. Furthermore, the odds deviate most
from a probability for the event with a low frequency count, which is consistent
with the base-rate effect. Observe that meaningful odds are given when x = 0
or n, and that q → x/n and q′ → (n − x)/n as n → ∞. Furthermore, we find
that for a fixed ratio x/n, q + q′ → 1 + c√
n
for some constant c as n→∞.
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3.2 Frequency model with logarithmic utility
This situation allows an essentially closed form solution for the odds. Using
equation (12) with Pr(x, n | pi) = Cnx pix(1− pi)n−x and Pr(pi) = 1, obtains
q =
(
x+ 1
n− x+ 1
)n−x+1
n+2
eψ, q′ =
(
n− x+ 1
x+ 1
) x+1
n+2
eψ,
ψ =
(
x+ 1
n+ 2
)
Hx+1 +
(
n− x+ 1
n+ 2
)
Hn−x+1 −Hn+2
where we use the harmonic numbers Hk =
∑k
i=1
1
i .
Figure 3 provides a table of computed values of the odds for small values
of n and graphs the odds for larger values. These computed odds should be
compared with fig. 1. Figure 4 shows how the total odds q+q′ varies with number
of observations, which should be compared with fig. 2. It is observed that the
total odds have a smaller excess over unity, and vary less with the observed
fraction. This is not surprising, because a client who aims to maximise their
rate of growth of wealth is less likely to exploit forecast errors of low probability
events. Observe also that the odds converge much faster in this situation, at a
rate of 1/n, as opposed to 1/
√
n in the infinitesimal bets case. (The author also
has closed form expressions for the odds in this case of an arbitrary number of
events, which will discussed elsewhere.)
3.3 Gaussian model with linear utility
Now consider a situation where the forecaster is given scalar observations D =
{x1, . . . , xn}, with statistics
µˆ =
1
n
∑
i
xi
σˆ2 =
1
n
∑
i
(xi − µˆ)2 = 1
n
∑
i
x2i − µˆ2.
Furthermore, the forecaster has reason to model these as observations of a ran-
dom variable X with a Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ2), for some unknown µ
and σ; although the forecaster may have additional prior belief Pr(µ, σ) in
the values of µ and σ. The client requires an odds forecast for the events
E = {X ≤ x} and E′ = {X > x} for some fixed x.
Since we are assuming a perfect model class (to avoid third order uncertainty
issues), then the true probability pi of the event E is
pi = Pr(X ≤ x) =
∫ x
−∞
1√
2piσ2
e−(t−µ)
2/2σ2 dt = Φ
(
x− µ
σ
)
.
Whereas the optimisation problem (5) that obtains the odds is formulated in
terms of integrals over the probabilities of the events, in this situation we see
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these probabilities are determined entirely from x, µ and σ. Consequently, it is
more appropriate to reformulate the optimisation (5) it terms of integrals over
µ and σ. This requires reformulating equations (3) and (4).
When the forecaster assigns odds q and q′ to E and E′ respectively, then
in the worst case where the client knows µ and σ (and hence pi) the optimal
strategy of the client is to bet on
E if
q
q + q′
< Φ
(
x− µ
σ
)
,
E′ if
q′
q + q′
< 1− Φ
(
x− µ
σ
)
.
and the average pay-out to client is then
V (q, q′ | x, µ, σ) = max
{
1
q
Φ
(
x− µ
σ
)
,
1
q′
(
1− Φ
(
x− µ
σ
))}
− 1.
Given their model the forecaster will assert that Pr(pi | D) ∝ Pr(D |
µ, σ) Pr(µ, σ) where
Pr(D | µ, σ) =
n∏
i=1
1√
2piσ2
e−(xi−µ)
2/2σ2
=
(
1√
2piσ2
)n
e−n(σˆ
2+(µˆ−µ)2)/2σ2 .
Just as in section 3.1 we once again have a situation involving binary events
where there is advantage in defining s = q + q′, q = ps, q′ = (1 − p)s, so that
problem (5) can be transformed to
min
0≤p≤1
s =
1
C
(
A(p, x)
1− p +
B(p, x)
p
)
,
where
A(p, x) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
M(p,x,σ)
Φ
(
x− µ
σ
)
F (µ, σ) dµ dσ,
B(p, x) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ M(p,x,σ)
−∞
(
1− Φ
(
x− µ
σ
))
F (µ, σ) dµ dσ,
C =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
F (µ, σ) dµ dσ,
M(p, x, σ) = x− σΦ−1(p),
F (µ, σ) = Pr(D | µ, σ) Pr(µ, σ).
The odds can be calculated once the prior Pr(µ, σ) has been assigned, how-
ever, the assignment of the prior requires a little care. It is not unreasonable
to assume no knowledge of µ, and hence place a uniform prior on µ. On the
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other hand, one cannot assume a uniform prior for σ, because the integrals will
diverge. Taking a uniform prior for σ on (0, R), then one finds that s → 1 and
p→ 1/2 as R→∞. Essentially a model that freely allows arbitrarily large vari-
ances cannot provide useful forecasts. Consequently, one is required to specify
a prior for σ with a tail that thins sufficiently rapidly.
Figure 5 shows numerically computed odds for a situation where µˆ = 0 and
σˆ = 1. The prior used was Pr(µ, σ) = σe−σ
2/2, which is a χ-distribution of
two degrees of freedom. This prior was used because we want σˆ = 1 to be a
typical observed value. The computed odds were similar for half-normal, F-
distributions and other similar distributions where σˆ = 1 is a typical observed
value. By a shift and scale the computed odds shown in fig. 5 provide a general
solution for arbitrary µˆ and σˆ. Let xi = µˆ+σˆzi so that the zi have mean zero and
variance one. These zi should be modelled as observations of a random variable
Z = (X − µˆ)/σˆ. The events of interested are now expressed as E = {Z ≤ z}
and E′ = {Z > z}, where x = µˆ + σˆz. Hence, if q(z) and s(z) represent the
odds and total odds for the generic case shown in fig. 5, then the odds in the
general case are obtained using z = (x− µˆ)/σˆ.
Figure 5 shows that the odds on E exceed one for z larger than about 1. Our
interpretation of this is that given the information available to the forecaster,
the event E is so likely that offering odds favourable to the client would be loss
making to the forecaster. The client is therefore offered odds so that to bet
on E makes a consistent small loss with an rare loss of −1, and to bet on E′
makes a consistent loss of −1 and a rare win.
3.4 Gaussian model with logarithmic utility
Computation of odds in this situation follow in a similar fashion to the previous
section, in that the integrals (12) are reformulated in terms of integrals over µ
and σ. Thus, using the same notation as the previous sections, the odds are
q = p¯ieα and q′ = (1− p¯i)eα where
H¯ =
1
C
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ((z − µ)/σ) log(Φ((z − µ)/σ))F (µ, σ) dµ dσ,
+
1
C
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
(1− Φ((z − µ)/σ)) log(1 − Φ((z − µ)/σ))F (µ, σ) dµ dσ,
p¯i =
1
C
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ((z − µ)/σ)F (µ, σ) dµ dσ,
α = H¯ − p¯i log(p¯i)− (1− p¯i) log(1− p¯i)
Figure 6 shows the computed odds for a situation where µˆ = 0 and σˆ = 1, and
the prior Pr(µ, σ) = σe−σ
2/2. These odds should be compared with the linear
utility situation shown in fig. 5. In comparison it is seen that the logarithmic
utility function gives odds with smaller excess s and less weight attached to the
large z values. this is similar to the frequency model, for the same reasons.
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4 Investment and loss mitigation
The client who has featured thus far in our analysis is more accurately described
as a speculative client, whose primary goal is to profit from inadequacies of the
forecaster’s predictions. We now introduce the invested client, whose wealth is
invested in some venture whose profit, costs, and losses are determined in part
by the outcomes of the events. Think here of the road-gritter, or horticulturist
who is concerned with the possibility of freezing temperatures. The invested
client has no desire or ability to challenge the forecaster’s skill, rather they
wish to use the forecasts to mitigate their losses. The invested client can do
this by betting against the forecaster; a bet is essentially an insurance policy.
In this section we analyse how an invested client should bet and show that
such bets are beneficial to the invested client despite the forecaster’s odds being
non-probabilistic. Furthermore, we will see that the client deals only with the
forecaster’s odds, they do not try to normalise the odds to obtain probability
“estimates”; the odds contain all the information the invested client needs.
4.1 Simple investment
Consider a situation where the return on a client’s investment is influenced by
whether an event E, or its complement E′, occurs. Let R be the return on the
investment when the event E occurs and R′ the return on E′. Let pi and pi′,
where pi+pi′ = 1, be the probabilities of the events E and E′ respectively, under
assumption that Nature selects the events at random. The expected return on
the investment is Rpi +R′pi′.
Now suppose the forecaster provides odds q and q′ for the events E and E′.
The game matrix for betting of these events is (1), in terms of the pay-outs
P = (1/q)− 1 and P ′ = (1/q′)− 1. If the client places bets with the forecaster
of λ ≥ 0 on the event E and λ′ ≥ 0 on the complement event E′, then the
expected return to the client is
(R + λP − λ′)pi + (R′ − λ+ λ′P ′)pi′.
If the client chooses the bets λ and λ′ so that R+λP −λ′ = R′−λ+λ′P ′, then
the client’s return is fixed and independent of pi and pi′, indeed independent of
which event occurs. Under this condition
R−R′ = (P ′ + 1)λ′ − (P + 1)λ = λ
′
q′
− λ
q
,
and so, if R > R′, then the client should bet λ = 0 and λ′ = q′(R − R′) for a
return of (1−q′)R+q′R′, and if R < R′, then the client should bet λ = q(R′−R)
and λ′ = 0 for a return of qR+ (1− q)R′.
Since q + q′ > 1 the returns with bets are less than the expected return
without bets, the advantage to the client is that by placing bets the return
is guaranteed and the risk is transferred to the forecaster. In a market of
forecasters those that offer the odds closer to being probabilities will attract
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more clients, but if their odds have not been calculated along the lines we have
described, then they will be almost surely bankrupted.
4.2 Mitigating losses
Consider a situation where a client incurs a loss L if an event E occurs, but
they can take an action at cost C which if taken results in inclusive mitigated
losses M . This situation is represented by the following game matrix.
client
nature
E E′
no action −L 0
action −M −C
In this situation it is usual that 0 < C < M < L, although it can happen that
mitigating the losses includes a reward that more than covers costs of the action
so that M < C. In either case the optimal strategy for the client is to take the
action when pi > C/(L+ C −M).
As before a forecaster provides odds on the events E and E′. Suppose the
client places bets λ and λ′ on E and E′ respectively when no action is taken,
and places bets µ and µ′ when the action is taken. The game matrix is the
following.
E E′
no action −L+ λP − λ′ λ′P ′ − λ
action −M + µP − µ′ −C + µ′P ′ − µ
Following the analysis of the previous subsection there are three possibilities:
(a) Take no action and place bets λ = qL and λ′ = 0, which results in a fixed
loss −qL.
(b) Given C < M , take the action and place bets µ = q(M − C) and µ′ = 0,
which results in a fixed loss −qM − (1− q)C.
(c) Given M < C, take the action and place bets µ = 0 and µ′ = q′(C −M),
which results in a fixed loss −(1− q′)M − q′C.
It follows that when 0 < C < M < L the client always bets on the event
occurring and takes the action when q > C/(L + C − M). In the situation
where 0 < M < C < L the client bets on the event occurring when taking no
action, and bets on the event not occurring when taking the action, and takes
the action when qL− (C −M)q′ > M . Once again if q+ q′ > 1, then the losses
with bets are more than the expected losses without bets, but the losses are
fixed and the forecaster takes the risk.
The important point to note about these results, and those of the previous
subsection, is the client uses the odds q and q′ directly, and does not normalise
these to obtain probability “estimates” q/(q + q′) and q′/(q + q′) of the events.
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All the useful information to the client in contained in the odds, and whether
the clients refers to both q and q′, or just one of these values, depends on their
circumstances. For example, in the 0 < C < M < L situation the decision to
take the action is based on q alone, where as, in the 0 < M < C < L situation
it depends on both q and q′, but not in a way that implies normalising them to
obtain probability “estimates”.
5 Ensemble Forecasting
Finally we consider an example of issuing of odds forecasts on temperature
variations using numerical ensemble weather predictions. A common event of
interest is whether the temperature at a locality will fall below freezing. These
events are fairly rare, so we consider a related and more general event of whether
the temperature at a location at some set lead-time falls more than a certain
amount below the current temperature at that station. These calculations are
intended to provide an illustration of odds forecasting using the results we have
obtained so far. We do not claim that the odds forecast we compute are the
best or most appropriate, indeed the results suggest otherwise. Odds based on
kernel density estimates, kernel dressing and the like could provide better odds
forecasts.
5.1 Data preparation
We use London Heathrow (Station 03772) as the locality and National Center
for Environmental Prediction GFS ensemble predictions [Troth, 2008] for con-
structing odds forecasts. The GFS model provides a temperature at the station
by interpolation of the temperatures of the global circulation model’s nearest
grid-points to the location. Our first step is to prepare suitable time series data
including bias correction and temporal interpolation.
The GFS 2-metre-temperature deterministic-forecast initialisation states were
used to calibrate GFS model temperatures with the station readings as follows.
Firstly, we compute a cubic spline of the time series of deterministic-forecast
initialisation states. Secondly, we compute using the spline a model tempera-
ture time-series to pair with the station temperature time-series. Finally, we fit
by least squares the model
y = p0(x) + p1(x) cos(2pih/24) + p2(x) sin(2pih/24), (17)
where y is the station temperature, x the splined model temperature, h the hour
of the day, and each pj(x) is a cubic polynomial. This is a twelve parameter
model. We used times series from the calendar year 2005. The residuals of
this model had mean 6.03 × 10−15, skewness 0.0736, kurtosis 0.9453 and stan-
dard error of 1.1159 degrees centigrade. Hence, this model provides a good
transformation from model state temperature to station temperature with an
expected error that is very nearly Gaussian and standard deviation of around
1.1159 degrees centigrade.
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To obtain ensemble forecasts at any lead-time we compute a cubic spline to
the time series of each ensemble member, then apply our fitted transform (17).
In the following these interpolated and transformed time-series will be re-
ferred to as the adjusted control and the adjusted ensemble forecasts. Figure 7
shows an example of the station data, adjusted control and adjusted ensemble
time-series.
5.2 Odds forecasts
The goal is to provide odds forecasts on whether the minimum daily temperature
at one to ten days lead-time will be less than 3 degrees centigrade below the
adjusted control temperature at the time of issuing the forecasts. In order to use
the results we have already derived we consider four forecasts. The first forecast
applies the odds from a frequency model, which is based on counting number
of adjusted ensemble members below the target threshold. The second forecast
applies the odds from a Gaussian model, which assumes the adjusted ensemble
members have a Gaussian distribution. The third forecast is a probabilistic
forecast obtained by assuming the adjusted ensemble members have a Gaussian
distribution. The forth forecast is intended to act as the ultimate-challenge
client. It is not really a forecast at all, but rather the predicted probability of
station temperature being below the threshold based on a Gaussian distribution
centred on the adjusted control with standard deviation equal to 1.1159, that
is, error of the fitted residuals.
Forecasts one to three represent three competing forecasters, one and two
providing non-probabilistic odds, three providing probabilistic odds. Forecast
four is used by the ultimate-challenge client. Nature is always taken to be
the station temperature. Using the methods described in the previous sections
odds forecasts can be computed. Figure 8 shows the odds computed using
the time-series data shown in fig. 7 in the case of a linear utility. Figure 9
shows the pay-out of the three forecasters when playing against the ultimate-
challenge client. Since the challenger is using a linear utility they will bet on
the temperature being below the threshold if the forecaster’s odds are less than
the challenger’s odds and visa versa. Observe that the challenger loses more
bets to forecaster 3, who uses probabilistic odds, than to forecasters 1 and 2,
who use non-probabilistic odds, however, the winning bets on low probability
events against forecaster 3 are astronomical. On the other hand, forecasters 1
and 2 appear to perform about the same.
We now consider the problem of forecasting whether the minimum temper-
ature at London Heathrow in the 24 hour period from 18:00UTC is more than
3 degrees centigrade below the control temperature when the forecasts are is-
sued. We will test the performance of the odds forecasts by computing the total
pay-out to the ultimate-challenge client for the first half of 2005 (183 days) for
lead times up to ten days. Figures 7 and 8 clearly demonstrate that the proba-
bilistic odds we have considered are not competitive with the non-probabilistic
odds. Certainly, large pay-outs result from assigning far too small probability
to low probability events, but what about the performance at other times? To
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investigate this question we consider a new non-probabilistic odds forecaster
(3′) that uses the probabilistic odds but sets minimum odds of 0.1, which ef-
fectively caps pay-outs at 10. These capped probabilities are a crude form of
odds. Odds capping could be applied by our forecasters 1 and 2, although in
the test considered it makes little difference. Table 1 shows the total pay-out to
the three non-probabilistic odds forecasters 1, 2, and 3′, on bets taken from the
ultimate-challenge client. If forecasters 1 and 2 are allowed odds caps of 0.1 is
these tests, then the cap only applies on around ten occasions and reduces the
larger pay-outs at lead times 5, 7, and 10 days to the level of their neighbouring
lead times.
A number of observations can be made about the results displayed in table 1.
Recall that the aim of the forecasters is to have an expected total pay-out of
zero. It is immediately clear that odds capping alone is not sufficient to make
forecaster 3′ competitive with forecasters 1 and 2 beyond a lead time of one or
two days. Forecasters 1 and 2 have similar performance although forecaster 2
is more successful. In all cases it appears that performance decreases with
increasing lead time.
6 Summary, discussion and conclusions
We have confronted forecasters with the challenge that if they offer a probability
forecast, then they should be prepared to accept bets at the odds these imply.
Unless a forecaster has a perfect forecast model, then they would be unwise to
accept this challenge, because any that do so will almost surely be bankrupted
by more informed bettors. We argue that probability forecasts fail to account
for higher order uncertainties, such as model error. Our alternative is to offer
non-probabilistic odds forecasts obtain using an optimisation principle. The
excess of the odds reveals the forecaster’s uncertainty about the model. We
have shown how to compute odds forecasts in several situations, and illustrated
how odds forecasts could be used in investment, loss mitigation, and weather
forecasting.
There are gaps in our development and demonstrations, especially in the
application to ensemble weather forecasting. A gap occurs because we have
only shown how to compute odds under the assumption of a perfect model
class; this assumption eliminates third and higher order uncertainties. Figure 7
shows that an assumption of a perfect model class is not well supported in
our application to ensemble weather forecasting, because during lead-times of
144 to 180 hours the entire forecast ensemble fails to represent what actually
happened. This implies the assumption that the ensemble is random selection
form the distribution of possibilities is false. Nonetheless, table 1 shows that
our odds calculation is sufficiently conservative at these lead times to cope fairly
well with this level of uncertainty; pay-outs of around 50 units compared to 200
units for capped probabilities. The goal, however, was that the pay-outs should
be zero on average. It would be optimistic to suggest this were the case for
lead times of 5 days or more. Improvement of these odds forecasts is certainly
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possible. Either by more careful consideration of the selection of the prior, or by
abandoning the simple frequency and Gaussian models for a more sophisticated
model that takes into account the conditional aspects of the weather. In analogy
to the urn game, a more sophisticated model means looking more closely at the
mixing process.
We have argued that odds forecasting has uses in investment and loss miti-
gation, we claim also that it can be used for model assessment. The results of
table 1 suggest that the Gaussian model is quite successful out to lead times of 5
days. Kernel-density based models may well do better, extending to longer lead
times, or having average pay-outs closer to zero. Comparison with an ultimate-
challenge client as we do provides a diagnostic of the models performance, and
furthermore, if a model achieves a zero average pay-out, then excess of the odds
provide indications of the model’s higher order uncertainty.
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x/n q q + q′
0/1 0.556 1.411
1/1 0.855 1.411
0/2 0.448 1.347
1/2 0.687 1.375
2/2 0.900 1.347
0/3 0.378 1.302
1/3 0.578 1.336
2/3 0.758 1.336
3/3 0.924 1.302
0/4 0.329 1.268
1/4 0.501 1.303
2/4 0.656 1.313
3/4 0.803 1.303
4/4 0.939 1.268
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Figure 1: Odds for frequency model with linear utility function. The table
shows for frequencies x/n of event E, and the values of q and q + q′, as com-
puted from (16). The value of q′ can be obtained, by symmetry, from the
frequency (n − x)/n. Values for larger n are plotted in fig. 1. Only marked
points are realizable values of the frequency.
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Figure 2: The total odds s = q + q′ for frequency model with linear utility
function. Only marked points are realizable values of the frequency.
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x/n q q + q′
0/1 0.382 1.146
1/1 0.764 1.146
0/2 0.277 1.11
1/2 0.558 1.116
2/2 0.832 1.11
0/3 0.217 1.087
1/3 0.438 1.094
2/3 0.656 1.094
3/3 0.87 1.087
0/4 0.179 1.073
1/4 0.359 1.078
2/4 0.54 1.079
3/4 0.719 1.078
4/4 0.894 1.073
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Figure 3: Odds for frequency model with logarithmic utility function. The table
shows for frequencies x/n of event E, and the values of q and q+q′, as computed
from the closed form formula. The value of q′ can be obtained, by symmetry,
from the frequency (n − x)/n. Values for larger n are plotted in fig. 1. Only
marked points are realizable values of the frequency.
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Figure 4: The total odds s = q+ q′ for frequency model with logarithmic utility
function. Only marked points are realizable values of the frequency.
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Figure 5: Odds q (dashed) and total odds s = q+ q′ (solid) for Gaussian model
with linear utility function, here computed for the generic situation µˆ = 0 and
σˆ = 1, prior Pr(µ, σ) = σe−σ
2
, and events E = {Z ≤ z} and E′ = {Z > z}. The
standard normal cumulative distribution function is also plotted for comparison
(dotted).
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Figure 6: Odds q (dashed) and total odds s = eα (solid) for Gaussian model with
logarithmic utility function, here computed for the generic situation µˆ = 0 and
σˆ = 1, prior Pr(µ, σ) = σe−σ
2
, and events E = {Z ≤ z} and E′ = {Z > z}. The
standard normal cumulative distribution function is also plotted for comparison
(dotted).
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Figure 7: Station temperature time series (+), the adjusted control (dashed)
and adjusted ensemble forecast time-series (solid). The horizontal line (dashed)
shows the threshold line for which the odds forecasts are required. The forecasts
shown were launched 00:00UTC day 40 of 2005.
27
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  12  24  36  48  60  72  84  96  108 120 132 144 156 168 180 192 204 216 228 240 252
O
dd
s
Lead time in hours
Figure 8: Four computed odds forecasts (linear utility) for the data shown in
figure 7. Frequency odds (dashed), Gaussian odds (solid), and probabilistic odds
(dash-dotted). Challenger (dashed) refers to the odds used by the ultimate-
challenge client against whom the forecasters must compete.
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Figure 9: The pay-outs of the three forecasters when faced with the ultimate-
challenge client, for linear utility. Frequency odds (dashed), Gaussian odds
(solid), and probabilistic odds (dash-dotted). Same data as shown is figures 7
and 8. The pay-outs are shown on a linear scale for pay-outs less than one, then
transitions into a logarithm base 10 scale above.
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Utility Linear Logarithmic
Lead 1. 2. 3′. 1. 2. 3′.
time Freq. Gaus. Capped Freq. Gaus. Capped
(days) odds odds Prob. odds odds Prob.
1 7.3 47.6 36.2 -1.19 -4.03 4.94
2 65.5 -11.7 160 8.97 -2 12.5
3 117 14.9 233 20.3 5.21 21.6
4 78.9 3.75 175 16.6 5.28 20.8
5 70.9 68.2 186 14.1 4.54 18.8
6 73.7 7.71 166 15.6 6.29 20
7 80.5 82.6 196 20.5 13.1 26.2
8 105 24.3 238 21 9.89 27.6
9 124 50.1 283 28.5 18 34.4
10 147 130 325 33.5 22.9 38.1
Table 1: Total pay-out of forecasters on bets taken from the ultimate-challenge
client on the event that the minimum temperature at London Heathrow in the
24 hours period from 18:00UTC is more than 3 degrees centigrade below the
control temperature when the forecasts are issued. Total computed over first
half of 2005. In the case of logarithmic utility the pay-out is expressed as the
logarithm base 10.
30
